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CALIFORNIA'S STATUTORY ATTEMPT TO
REGULATE FOREIGN CORPORATIONS:
WILL IT SURVIVE THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE?
Section 2115 of the California Corporations Code asserts control over se-
lect internal affairs of a foreign corporation if the corporation satisfies the
two tests outlined in the statute. Examples of internal affairs include the
election and removal of directors, method of voting for directors, and reor-
ganizations and mergers. This Comment examines section 2115 in relation
to the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. California's in-
terests in enforcing the statute are balanced against the burdens imposed
upon the free flow of interstate commerce. The author concludes that ap-
plication of section 2115 excessively burdens interstate commerce and is
therefore unconstitutional.
INTRODUCTION
State legislatures seeking to regulate foreign corporations doing
business in their states have found regulation a difficult task. To
prevent corporate desertion and to attract new corporate registra-
tions, several states have been forced to loosen their grip on man-
agement and to pass statutes similar to Delaware's corporation
law,' the most lenient in the country.2 A consequence of emascu-
lated corporate laws is that statutory protection of shareholders,
creditors, and the public has often been sacrificed.3
In defiance of the general trend toward increased management
favoritism, California enacted several provisions of its General
Corporation Law4 providing greater protection t6 shareholders
and creditors. For example, mandatory cumulative voting, a state
policy since 1878, is retained 5 staggered boards of directors are
1. See Comment, The Pseudo-Foreign Corporation in California, 28 HASTINGS
L.J. 119, 119 (1976).
2. W. CARY, CORPORATIONS 13 (4th ed. 1970); see Kaplan, Foreign Corpora-
tions and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REv. 433, 436-37 (1968).
3. W. CAY, CoRoRATIONS 13 (4th ed. 1970).
4. CAL. Com'. CODE §§ 100-2319 (West 1976).
5. Id. § 708.
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forbidden; 6 annual election of directors is required;7 and directors
may be removed without cause.8 The drafting committee was
aware that the proposed statutory amendments contained numer-
ous provisions for the protection of shareholders and creditors
that were more restrictive than the Delaware model. A restrictive
corporations code would be "largely an exercise in futility if those
restrictions [could] be nullified by the simple device of incorpo-
rating or reincorporating in some other state."9 As a result, sec-
tion 2115 of the California Corporations Code' 0 was enacted to
6. Id. § 301.
7. Id. §§ 301, 600.
8. Id. § 303.
9. Major Changes in the Calif. Corporation Law: Hearings on A.B. 376 Before
the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary, Cal. Legis., 1975-76 Reg. Sess. 4 (state-
ment of Harold Marsh, Jr.).
10. Ch. 235, § 19, 1977 Cal. Stats. 1073 (codified at CAI_ CORP. CODE § 2115 (West
Supp. 1978)). The text of § 2115 is as follows:
(a) A foreign corporation (other than a foreign association or foreign
nonprofit corporation but including a foreign parent corporation even
though it does not itself transact intrastate business) is subject to this
section if the average of the property factor, the payroll factor and the
sales factor (as defined in Sections 25129, 25132, and 25134 of the Revenue
and Taxation Code) with respect to it is more than 50 percent during its
latest full income year and if more than one-half of its outstanding voting
securities are held of record by pekson having addresses in this state.
The property factor, payroll factor and sales factor shall be those used in
computing the portion of its income allocable to this state in its franchise
tax return or, with respect to corporations the allocation of whose income
is governed by special formulas or which are not required to file separate
tax returns, which would have been so used if they were governed by such
three-factor formula. The determination of these factors with respect to
any parent corporation shall be made on a consolidated basis, including in
a unitary computation (after elimination of intercompany transactions)
the property, payroll and sales of the parent and all of its subsidiaries in
which it owns directly or indirectly more than 50 percent of the outstand-
ing shares entitled to vote for the election of directors, but deducting a
percentage of such property, payroll and sales of any subsidiary equal to
the percentage minority ownership, if any, in such subsidiary. For the
purpose of this subdivision, any securities held to the knowledge of the is-
suer in the names of broker-dealers or nominees for broker-dealers shall
not be considered outstanding.
(b) The following chapters and sections of this divsion shall apply to a
foreign corporation subject to this section (to the exclusion of the law of
the jurisdiction in which it is incorporated):
Chapter 1 (general provisions and definitions), to the extent applicable
to the following provisions;
Section 301 (annual election of directors);
Section 303 (removal of directors without cause);
Section 304 (removal of directors by court proceedings);
Section 305, subdivision (c) (filing of director vacancies where less than
a majority in office elected by shareholders);
Section 309 (directors' standard of care);
Section 316 (excluding paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) and paragraph
(3) of subdivision (f)) (liability of directors for unlawful distributions);
Section 317 (indemnification of directors, officers and others);
Sections 500 to 505, inclusive (limitations on corporate distributions in
cash or property);
Section 506 (liability of shareholder who receives unlawful distribution);
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prevent foreign corporations from circumventing California law
while doing business in California.1
Corporations falling within the purview of section 2115 have tra-
ditionally been referred to as pseudo-foreign corporations.12 Sec-
Section 600, subdivisions (b) and (c) (requirement for annual share-
holders' meeting and remedy if same not timely held);
Section 708, subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) (shareholder's right to cumu-
late votes at any election of directors);
Section 1001, subdivision (d) (limitations on sale of assets);
Section 1101 (provisions following subdivision (e)) (limitations on
mergers);
Chapter 12 (commencing with Section 1200) (reorganizations);
Chapter 13 (commencing with Section 1300) (dissenters' rights);
Sections 1500 and 1501 (records and reports);
Section 1508 (action by Attorney General);
Chapter 16 (commencing with Section 1600) (rights of inspection).
(c) Subdivision (a) shall become applicable to any foreign corporation
only upon the first day of the first income year of the corporation com-
mencing on or after the 30th day after the filing by it of the report pursu-
ant to Section 2108 showing that the tests referred to in subdivision (a)
have been met or on or after the entry of a final order by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction declaring that such tests have been met.
(d) Subdivision (a) shall cease to be applicable at the end of any in-
come year during which a report pursuant to Section 2108 shall have been
filed showing that at least one of the tests referred to in subdivision (a) is
not met or a final order shall have been entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction declaring that one of such tests is not met, provided that such
filing or order shall be ineffective if a contrary report or order shall be
made or entered before the end of suchincome year.
(e) This section does not apply to any corporation with outstanding se-
curities listed on any national securities exchange certified by the Com-
missioner of Corporations under subdivision (o) of Section 25100, or to
any corporation if all of its voting shares (other than directors' qualifying
shares) are owned directly or indirectly by a corporation not subject to
this section.
11. Only one other state, New York, has enacted a provision affecting corpo-
rate internal affairs similar to California's § 2115. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1320 (Mc-
Kinney 1963). The New York statute is applicable to foreign corporations
conducting 50% or more of their business within New York State.
The North Carolina Legislature considered extending its laws to include pseudo-
foreign corporations in 1954; however, the provision was never adopted. 1955 N.C.
Sess. Laws, ch. 1371.
Several states have statutes putting the internal affairs of a foreign corporation
beyond the reach of local law, adopting a "hands-off" attitude. These states in-
clude: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.597 (Michie 1968); Arizona, ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 10-106 (West 1977); Illinois, IL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.102 (West 1957);
Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.103 (West Supp. 1978-79); Mississippi, MISS. CODE
ANN. § 79-3-211 (Harrison 1973); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-20, 105 (1977); Ore-
gon, OR. REV. STAT. § 57.665 (1977); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2001
(West 1967); South Dakota, S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 47-8-3 (1969); and Virginia,
VA. CODE § 13.1-102 (Michie 1978).
12. A "pseudo-foreign" corporation is a corporation chartered in one state but
conducting business and operations entirely or in part in another state. A corpora-
tion 2115 provides for regulation by the California Corporations
Code of selected internal affairs13 of a corporation domiciled in
another state. When it is ascertained that (1) more than fifty per-
cent of the average of a corporation's property,14 payroll,' 5 and
sales16 factors are allocated to California, and (2) more than one-
half of its voting securities are held of record 7 by persons having
an address in California, then section 2115 applies. Foreign corpo-
rations with securities listed on a national securities exchange
certified by the Commissioner of Corporations are not subject to
the provisions of section 2115.18
Important constitutional issues are raised by the provisions
of section 2115. Following a historical overview of California's
attempts to deal with pseudo-foreign corporations, this Com-
ment will center on the effect section 2115 has on interstate com-
merce and whether it conforms to the commerce clause19 of the
United States Constitution. The full faith and credit,20 equal pro-
tion chartered in one state but conducting business and operations wholly in an-
other state is commonly referred to as a "tramp" corporation.
13. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(b) (West Supp. 1978).
14. The property factor is defined as:
[A] fraction, the numerator of which is the average value of the tax-
payer's real and tangible personal property owned or rented and used in
this stage during the income year and the denominator of which is the av-
erage value of all the taxpayer's real and tangible personal property
owned or rented and used during the income year.
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 25129 (West 1970).
15. The payroll factor is defined as "a fraction, the numerator of which is the
total amount paid in this state during the income year by the taxpayer for com-
pensation, and the denominator of which is the total compensation paid every-
where during the income year." Id. § 25132.
16. The sales factor is defined as "a fraction, the numerator of which is the to-
tal sales of the taxpayer in this state during the income year, and the denominator
of which is the sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the income year." Id.
§ 25134.
17. Securities known by the issuer to be held in the names of broker-dealers
or nominees for broker-dealers are not considered "outstanding" for purposes of
§ 2115.
18. CAL CORP. CODE § 2115(e) (West Supp. 1978). At the time of this writing
only the New York and American Stock Exchanges have been certified by the
Commissioner, and only corporations with securities listed on those exchanges
are exempt from § 2115.
19. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The commerce clause states: 'The Congress
shall have Power ... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes. .. ."
20. Id. art. IV, § 1. The full faith and credit clause provides that the public acts
of a state are entitled to recognition by other states. An enabling statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (1976), requires that full faith and credit be given to the public acts, includ-
ing statutes, of other states.
Some of the factors relevant to whether the law of the state of incorporation,
rather than the law of the forum state, must be applied include considerations of
uniformity of application, certainty, and predictability, and the nature and inten-
sity of the perceived state interest. Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corpo-
rate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 CoLUii. L.
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tection,21 and contracts clauses22 of the Constitution also threaten
the legality of section 2115; however, these issues are beyond the
scope of this Comment.
THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO REGULATION OF FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS
In the absence of a statute such as section 2115, courts have tra-
ditionally applied the internal affairs doctrine to regulate foreign
corporations.23 This doctrine provides that the law of the forum
may be applied to questions regarding the external affairs of a
corporation, but the law of the state of incorporation must be ap-
plied to questions regarding internal corporate affairs.24
The internal affairs doctrine is a product of the vested rights
theory of choice-of-law questions. Under this approach, the rights
of a party are said to vest in the state where those rights are cre-
ated. The law of that state must be applied regardless of where
REV. 1118, 1133 (1958). The United States Supreme Court case of Broderick v. Ros-
ner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935), held that the full faith and credit clause requires that
rights accorded a corporation under the laws of the state of its incorporation may
not be impinged upon by legislation in other states. Id. at 646-47. By refusing to
allow an incorporating state's provisions to regulate the internal affairs of its cor-
porations, California, through § 2115, may be unconstitutionally denying full faith
and credit to the corporation codes of other states.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For a discussion of the equal protection pro-
visions of the United States Constitution, see text accompanying notes 105-11 in-
fra.
22. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10. The contracts clause of the Constitution states: "No
State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts... ." The
right of liberty of contract is not absolute and is subject to the police power of the
state. However, the power of a state legislature to limit a contractual right must
always rest upon some reasonable basis and cannot be arbitrarily exercised. Ex
parte Drexel, 147 Cal. 763, 82 P. 429 (1905).
The rights, duties, and obligations of the members of a corporation's board of di-
rectors are contractual in nature. San Pedro Lumber Co. v. Reynolds, 121 Cal. 74,
78-79, 53 P. 410, 410-11 (1898). A byproduct of § 2115's application is the forced abro-
gation of contracts with those directors whose terms have not yet expired. For ex-
ample, if a director is serving a three-year term under staggered board provisions
mandated by a foreign corporation's charter and bylaws, when § 2115 is applied
the director's term will necessarily end at the next shareholders' meeting pursu-
ant to California law. CAL. CORP. CODE § 301 (West 1977). A corporation would be
compelled to breach valid contractual agreements with its directors because such
agreements may run afoul of the contracts clause.
23. Oldham, California Regulates Pseudo-Foreign Corporations-Trampling
Upon the Tramp?, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 85, 90-91 (1977).
24. See, e.g., Southern Sierras Power Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 205 Cal. 479, 271
P. 747 (1928).
the action is brought.25 Although the Supreme Court has occa-
sionally invalidated choice-of-law decisions made by state courts,
the internal affairs doctrine has never been invalidated by the
Supreme Court when applied by a state to the internal affairs of a
classic business corporation.26
ISTORICAL REGULATION OF PSEUDo-FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN
CALIFORNIA
Case Law
Several states, including California, have long entertained judi-
cially created exceptions to the internal affairs doctrine.2 V On sev-
eral occasions California has applied its own corporation laws to
the internal affairs of a foreign corporation.28 Early California
court cases established a twofold judicial determination with re-
spect to application of California law.29 First, a corporation by lo-
cating all of its property, business, and managerial operations in
California was not considered truly foreign. Second, the plaintiff
had to be a California resident in need of relief which would be
denied if the internal affairs doctrine were applied.
Following World War HI, the developing California policy with
respect to pseudo-foreign corporations focused on securities regu-
lation rather than on case law. The California Commissioner of
Corporations exercised control over pseudo-foreign corporations
by regulating any securities transactions affecting California
shareholders of the corporation.3 0
In 1961, the Commissioner's regulatory power was tested in the
25. Oldham, California Regulates Pseudo-Foreign Corporations-Trampling
Upon the Tramp?, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 85, 90-92 (1977).
26. An example of the United States Supreme Court's invalidation of a state's
choice of law is Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
27. For examples of significant cases in states other than California where the
internal affairs doctrine has been judicially circumvented, see Mansfield Hard-
wood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1959); Weede v. Iowa S. Util.
Co., 231 Iowa 784, 2 N.W.2d 372 (1942); German-American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 216
N.Y. 57, 109 N.E. 875 (1915).
28. See, e.g., Provident Gold Mining Co. v. Haynes, 173 Cal. 44, 159 P. 155
(1916); Walt v. Kern River Mining Co., 157 Cal. 16, 106 P. 98 (1909); Sharp v. Big Jim
Mines, 39 Cal. App. 2d 435, 103 P.2d 430 (1940); Stapler v. El Dora Oil Co., 27 Cal.
App. 516, 150 P. 643 (1915).
29. See, e.g., Sharp v. Big Jim Mines, 39 Cal. App. 2d 435, 103 P.2d 430 (1940) (a
California court for the first time firmly established judicial criteria as to what con-
stituted a pseudo-foreign corporation subject to California law).
Big Jim Mines was an Arizona corporation. Because its principal place of busi-
ness, its corporate books and records, and the mining interest owned by the corpo-
ration were all located entirely within California, the corporation was rendered
subject to California laws governing internal corporate affairs.
30. See generally Comment, California's New General Corporation Law:
Quasi-Foreign Corporations, 7 PAc. L.J. 673, 678 (1976).
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leading case of Western Airlines, Inc. v. Sobieski.31 Western Air-
lines, a Delaware corporation, conducted a substantial amount of
business in California. Approximately thirty percent of the com-
pany's shares were held by California residents. 32 Western Air-
lines sought a charter amendment to eliminate cumulative voting,
a lawful change in Delaware but not in California.33 The Califor-
nia Commissioner of Corporations contended that the proposed
change was a "sale" under California law and thus subject to his
approval.34 Upon application for this approval, Western Airlines
was denied a permit on the ground that the proposed change was
unfair.35 Western Airlines appealed the ruling, arguing that the
sale would occur primarily outside California. In upholding the
Commissioner's action, the California appellate court emphasized
that Western Airlines conducted a substantial amount of busi-
ness in California36 and stated, "Unless it can be said that the
Corporation Commissioner's characterization of such corporation
as 'pseudo-foreign' is arbitrary, it would appear to be a matter
well within his administrative discretion."3 7
The Western Airlines decision caused considerable confusion
among corporate planners. Although courts in earlier cases had
exercised control over pseudo-foreign corporations that did nearly
all of their business in California, Western Airlines applied Cali-
fornia law to a foreign corporation with only thirty percent of its
shareholders residing in California and having only a substantial
portion of its business conducted within the state.3 8 The Western
31. 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961).
32. Id. at 402, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
33. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (1975), with CAL CORP. CODE § 708
(West Supp. 1978).
34. Qualification is the process of submitting for approval to the California
Commissioner of Corporations information about a proposed sale or exchange of
securities. Without the Commissioner's approval, a sale or exchange of securities
offered to the public cannot take place lawfully. See generally CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 25100-25160 (West 1977).
35. Western Airlines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 401-03, 12 Cal. Rptr.
719, 720-22 (1961). Under California securities law a permit may be denied on the
grounds that is is not 'Just and fair." This is in sharp contrast to federal regula-
tions which require only an adequate level of disclosure.
36. Id. at 402, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
37. Id. at 412, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
38. See Provident Gold Mining Co. v. Haynes, 173 Cal. 44, 159 P. 155 (1916);
Wait v. Kern River Mining Co., 157 Cal. 16, 106 P. 98 (1909); Sharp v. Big Jim Mines,
39 Cal. App. 2d 435, 103 P.2d 430 (1940); Stapler v. El Dora Oil Co., 27 Cal. App. 516,
150 P. 643 (1915). Each of the above cases involved a corporation, chartered in a
Airlines decision clearly broadened the concept of a pseudo-for-
eign corporation.
Attempts at Statutory Regulation
Following Western Airlines, corporate management called upon
the California Legislature for more definite and precise criteria to
indicate when California law would be applied to a foreign corpo-
ration. The California Corporate Securities Law of 196839 estab-
lished a definitive test. Section 2510340 prohibited the
Commissioner from asserting jurisdiction over any foreign corpo-
ration unless at least twenty-five percent of the corporation's
shares were held by persons having California addresses. The
shareholder residency test, supplanting earlier judicial and ad-
ministrative guidelines, became the sole determinative factor re-
specting the applicability of California securities regulations to
foreign corporations. This test remained the controlling guideline
until the enactment of section 2115 as part of the 1975 revisions to
the General Corporation Law.41
CORPORATE EFFORTS TO AvoiD APPLICATION OF SECTION 2115
Because section 2115 mandates significant changes in estab-
lished corporate internal operations,42 foreign corporations will
probably attempt to avoid application of section 2115. These ef-
forts will take three forms: (1) the use of subdivision (e), which
exempts corporations listed on certain national securities ex-
changes; (2) artificial attempts to reduce California's interests, as
computed in either of section 2115's tests of applicability;43 and
(3) actual reduction of California contacts.
state other than California, which conducted all of its business operations in Cali-
fornia.
39. Ch. 88, § 2, 1968 Cal. Stats. 243 (codified at CAL CORP. CODE §§ 25000-25804
(West 1977)).
40. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25103 (West 1977).
41. Ch. 235, § 19, 1977 Cal. Stats. 1073 (codified at CAL. CoRP. CODE § 2115 (West
Supp. 1978)). The inadequacies of § 25103 became apparent in the years following
its enactment. The private placement offering, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(a) (West
1976), permits a nonpublic sale of securities to fewer than 11 people without ob-
taining an issuance certificate from the Commissioner of Corporations, thereby
completely avoiding his regulatory power. In 1975 there were 1,350 private place-
ment offering qualification applications filed, and the trend is increasing. At least
135 of the applications came from foreign corporations. DEPARTMENT OF CORPORA-
TIONS QUALIFICATIONS AND REGISTRATION DiIVSION, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT
OF ACTIVITIES FOR THE STATE (1975).
42. Most significant of the changes in internal operations required by § 2115
are annual election of directors, removal of directors without cause, and cumula-
tive voting for election of directors. For a complete listing and cross reference to
controlling California code sections, see CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(b), note 10 supra.
43. See text accompanying notes 14-18 supra.
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Subdivision (e) exempts corporations listed on national securi-
ties exchanges certified by the California Commissioner of Co-
porations. The theory behind this exemption is that federal
securities regulations provide protection for investors equivalent
to that provided under California law. Federal securities regula-
tions do not, however, deal with some of the internal affairs ad-
dressed by section 2115.44 Federal securities regulations focus on
assuring adequate disclosure of relevant facts regarding a securi-
ties issuer.45 California's Corporation Law seeks not only ade-
quate disclosure, but fair, just, and equitable corporate
proceedings.4 6
Artificial attempts to circumvent application of section 2115 will
focus on the number of outstanding shares held by persons with a
California address. For example, an address change established
through a voting trust in another state will exempt those shares
registered under the trustee's foreign address from the provisions
of section 2115. Actual reduction of a corporation's contacts with
California will take place by a reduction of business transacted in
California, movement of plants and facilities out of the state, or in
the rare extreme, inducing shareholders of major blocks of securi-
ties to physically move from California to another state.
The application of section 2115 to foreign corporations raises
several questions of a constitutional nature. Foremost among
these considerations are challenges based upon the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution.47
COMMERCE CLAUSE BACKGROUND AND TRADITIONAL COURT TESTS
The commerce clause has frequently been held to limit the ap-
plication of state law to interstate situations.48 The primary rea-
44. For example, they do not provide standards for director election and re-
moval, a director's standard of care, and a right to cumulate votes in the election
of directors. See Comment, The Pseudo-Foreign Corporation in California, 28
HASTINGS L.J. 119, 129 (1976). This exemption also raises the constitutional ques-
tion of equal protection of the laws. See text accompanying notes 105-10 infra.
45. In re Universal Camera Corp., 19 S.E.C. 648, 656-57 (1945).
46. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25140 (West 1977).
47. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For the text of the commerce clause, see note 19 supra.
48. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S.
349 (1951); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511
(1935); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925).
son for enactment of the commerce clause was the mutual
jealousies and aggressions of the states, expressed in the form of
customs barriers and other economic retaliation.49 The Madis-
onian interpretation of the commerce clause was premised on a
widely held opinion that the Articles of Confederation had failed
in large part because the states had waged destructive trade wars
against one another and that state governments had been overly
responsive to local economic interests.50 As a result, discrimina-
tory, self-protective, and retaliatory state actions were occasioned
by the state governments' tendency to pursue their separate in-
terests at the expense of one another.51 The commerce clause
was designed to remedy this economic isolationism by giving
Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states.52
Courts have employed various tests in attempting to determine
when state legislation violates the commerce clause.53 Two
landmark United States Supreme Court decisions, Southern Pa-
cific Co. v. Arizona 54 and Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,55 ad-
dress the problems created by conflicting state legislation which
affects interstate commerce.
In Southern Pacific, Arizona had declared unlawful the opera-
tion in Arizona of a railroad train exceeding a specified length.
Adherence to the provision necessitated breaking up long trains
before they entered Arizona and reassembling them after they
left. The Supreme Court did not challenge Arizona's authority to
make laws governing matters of local concern. 56 However, in in-
validating the statute as violative of the commerce clause, the
Court reasoned that Arizona's interest failed to outweigh the na-
49. 3 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 547-48
(rev. ed. 1966).
50. Id. at 478.
51. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrruoONAL LAW § 6-3, at 321 (1978).
52. In January of 1786, the General Assembly of Virginia, which ultimately
produced the United States Constitution, initially gathered the states together
solely "to take into consideration the trade of the United States; to examine the
relative situation and trade of the said states; to consider how far a uniform sys-
tem in their commercial regulations may be necessary to their common interest
and their permanent harmony." H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1927).
53. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (Court focused
on whether a state's action had a direct impact on interstate commerce and was
thus invalid, or whether the effect was indirect only and permissible); Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (Court distinguished those aspects
of commerce so local in character as to allow state regulation from those aspects
of interstate commerce so national in character as to require a single uniform rule
to be supplied by Congress).
54. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
55. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
56. 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945); see California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 113-14
(1941); South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 187-96
(1938); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 399-400 (1913).
[VOL. 16: 943, 1979] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
tional interest in keeping interstate commerce free from overly
burdensome interferences.5 7
In Bibb, Illinois had enacted a safety measure specifying a par-
ticular type of mudguard for trucks operating on Illinois high-
ways. The mudguard required by Illinois was different from that
permitted in at least forty-five other states and it was illegal in Ar-
kansas. Finding a need for national uniformity of regulation, the
Court struck down the Illinois statute because of its adverse ef-
fect on interstate commerce.5 8
Both the Southern Pacific and Bibb Courts employed a balanc-
ing test, weighing state interests against the benefits of national
uniformity. Legislation aimed at furthering public health or
safety or at restraining fraudulent 59 or otherwise unfair trade
practices is less likely to be seen as an undue burden on inter-
state commerce than are, for example, state regulations seeking
to maximize the profits of local businesses. 60 Under the balancing
test, a state may, in the proper exercise of its police power, enact
statutes which will affect interstate commerce, provided the effect
is only incidental.61
The balancing test fostered by the Southern Pacific and Bibb
Courts was given further dimension in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc.62 In Pike, the United States Supreme Court struck down an
Arizona statute that required cantaloupes grown in-state to be
processed in-state. The Court found that the sole purpose of the
act was to boost the state's agricultural reputation, and the Court
enunciated the current standard for determining whether a stat-
ute violates the commerce clause:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental,
it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits .... If a legitimate lo-
cal purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the
extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the
57. 325 U.S. 761, 776 (1945).
58. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959).
59. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); California v. Thomp-
son, 313 U.S. 109 (1941); L TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTioNAL LAW § 6-6, at 329
(1978).
60. L. TamE, AMERICAN CONsTrruIToU LAW § 6-12, at 340 (1978). See, e.g.,
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307
(1925).
61. 17 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8422,
at 339 (rev. ed. 1977).
62. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted
as well with lesser impact on interstate activities. 63
Application of the Pike test to section 2115 would require that
four standards be met: (1) there must be a legitimate local public
interest;64 (2) there must be only an incidental effect on interstate
commerce; (3) the effect must not be excessive in relation to the
purported local benefits; and (4) the statute must regulate even-
handedly.65 Section 2115 violates the commerce clause when ex-
amined according to the Pike criteria.
APPLICATION OF THE PIKE TEST TO SECTION 2115
A Legitimate Local Public Interest
Although the authority to regulate interstate commerce is ex-
pressly given to Congress by the United States Constitution, 66 a
state, through exercise of its police power, may regulate items af-
fecting interstate commerce if necessary for preservation of the
safety, health, comfort, morals, or general welfare of its citizens.6 7
Section 2115 was enacted pursuant to California's police power
primarily to protect California creditors and shareholders from
fraud and unfair corporate practices.6 8 This protection is a valid
exercise of the state's police power.69 A corporation conducting
business in California necessarily affects the interests of some
segment of the public. Any person or corporation engaging in
63. Id. at 142 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
64. The terms "local interest" and "local public interest" refer to the state and
may be used interchangeably in this context with "state interest."
65. See also Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443
(1960).
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
67. Under the American constitutional system, police power is left to the
states by virtue of their general sovereignty. Each state has the power to regulate
the relative rights and duties of all persons, individuals, and corporations within
its jurisdiction for the public convenience and the public good. The only limit to
state exercise of power in the enactment of police laws is that the laws cannot be
repugnant to the provisions of the state or national constitutions. See generally
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275 (1918), overruled on other grounds in
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941); In re Rameriz, 193 Cal. 633, 226
P. 914 (1924); Gaylon v. Municipal Court, 229 Cal. App. 2d 667, 40 Cal. Rptr. 446
(1964); People v. Cordero, 50 Cal. App. 2d 146, 122 P.2d 648 (1942); 16 AM. Jun. 2d
Constitutional Law § 274 (1964); 13 CAL. JuR. 3d Constitutional Law §§ 117-154
(1974).
68. The 1975 Legislative Committee Comment of the California Assembly to
the proposed § 2115 states that the section will apply to any foreign corporation
"with specified minimum contacts in this state... for the protection of California
creditors and shareholders." CAL. CoRP. CODE § 2115, Legislative Committee Com-
ment (West 1977) (following cited code section) (emphasis added).
69. Hart v. City of Beverly Hills, 11 Cal. 2d 343, 79 P.2d 1080 (1938). See also 13
CAL. Ju-. 3d Constitutional Law § 134 (1974).
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business in California is subject to reasonable regulations to pro-
tect public welfare.
However, it is difficult to understand why California so dili-
gently strives to protect creditor interests. Creditors are not co-
erced to transact business or to develop contacts with any
corporate entity. Debtor-creditor transactions are usually busi-
ness dealings at arm's length. Creditor protection should arise
from self-initiated industry regulation, legal counsel, and contrac-
tual provisions.
The legitimate goal of shareholder protection is furthered by
section 2115. Certain internal affairs as regulated by section 2115
offer greater benefits of stock ownership to minority shareholders
than allowed by many states. For example, cumulative voting
safeguards minority representation on a corporation's board of di-
rectors.70 In order to preserve the benefit of cumulative voting, all
of the directors must be voted for at one time.71 For this reason,
annual election of all directors is mandated by section 2115.
Although protection of shareholders is a valid exercise of Cali-
fornia's police power, the protections assured by section 2115 are
excessive. The California Legislature, through enactment of this
section, has rejected provisions such as straight one-vote-per-
share voting and staggered election of directors, which other
states have determined are adequate to protect the public wel-
fare. Although California's police power interest is well estab-
lished, even a legitimate state interest cannot justify a statute
having overly burdensome effects on interstate commerce.
Incidental Effect on Interstate Commerce Not Excessive in
Relation to the Purported Local Benefits
When a state legislates a provision such as section 2115, the
statute must be examined to ascertain whether it places an undue
burden on the free flow of interstate commerce. 72 Uniformity of
70. Cumulative voting allows a shareholder to cumulate his votes at an elec-
tion for directors and give one candidate a number of votes equal to the number of
directors to be elected, multiplied by the number of votes to Which the share-
holder's shares are entitled. The effect is to allow minority shareholders the op-
portunity to elect representation on the board of directors.
71. 15 CAL. Ju. 3d Corporations § 318 (1974).
72. Baraf, The Foreign Corporation-A Problem in Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 33
BROOKLYN L. REV. 219 (1967); Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Af-
fairs: Choice of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
1118 (1958).
corporate internal affairs is necessary to assure corporate man-
agement certainty in its dealings. The internal affairs doctrine of-
fers certainty by consistently applying the law of the
incorporating state. There can be no uncertainty in identifying
the state of incorporation.
For many corporations, it is highly desirable to incorporate in a
state with a large body of case law interpreting corporate statutes,
thus affording greater certainty of statutory interpretation. 73
Many corporations are attracted to Delaware because of Dela-
ware's enormous body of case law.74 Thus, companies that incor-
porate in Delaware know precisely what they can or cannot do in
almost any circumstance.7 5 Attempting to supersede established
law of the state of incorporation with local law could culminate
and has culminated in confrontation between conflicting state
laws.7 6 Increased confrontation will ultimately lead to increased
litigation. A chaotic condition will result if the regulations per-
taining to corporate internal affairs are continually subject to fluc-
tuation.
The most unstable aspect of section 2115 is subsection (d). This
subsection provides that section 2115 shall cease to be applicable
at the end of any income year in which either the average of pay-
roll, property, and sales attributable to California falls below fifty
percent, or less than half of the shares outstanding are held by
shareholders with a California address. The applicability of sec-
tion 2115 to a foreign corporation is determined annually, pursu-
ant to information supplied each year by the corporation to the
California Franchise Tax Board. Thus, the entire internal struc-
ture of a corporation, including election and removal of directors,
method of voting for directors, inspection of records and reports,
and reorganizations and mergers, could potentially be controlled
by a different state law each year.
Because a business in its infancy is normally unstable, applica-
tion of section 2115(d) could be particularly damaging to a newly
formed corporation. A new corporation might find that the
amount of business transacted in a state rapidly fluctuates be-
cause of expansion to other states. Additional stock offerings
could significantly change the percentage of stock attributable to
73. A. FREY, J. CHOPER, N. LEECH, & C. MORRIS, JR., CASES AND MATERIAS ON
CORPORATIONS 25 (2d ed. 1977).
74. Smith, Delaware Works Hard to Stay a Corporate Home Sweet Home, FOR-
TuNE, Feb. 13, 1978, at 132-33.
75. Id.
76. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978). "Local
law" as used here refers to the law of a state, other than the state of incorporation,
in which a foreign coporation conducts business.
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shareholders having a California address. Section 2115(d) and its
annual application test pose a serious impediment to a new cor-
poration's growth. Applications of section 2115 could foster corpo-
rate relocations, remove the incentive to expand business, and, in
some instances, even cause a reduction of business in California.
A corporation might, by choice or necessity, take extensive meas-
ures to avoid the application of California law. The corporation
could thereby impede its growth by directing attention to matters
other than the conduct of business.
A corporation placed in such a quandary could lose business
opportunities by appearing confused and uncertain to potential as
well as established customers. Opportunities could be overlooked
simply because the corporation's board of directors is preoccu-
pied with the question of whether it still legally constitutes the
board. In today's business climate, a decision or failure to make a
decision by one corporation is felt by many, including suppliers,
distributors, parts manufacturers, advertisers, and retail outlets.
The cumulative effect in all those areas is far more than an inci-
dental impact on commerce.7 7 The interference with interstate
commerce occasioned by section 2115 is excessive in relation to
the purported local benefits.
Section 2115's impact on interstate commerce was brought into
focus in a recent California superior court case, Louart v. Arden-
Mayfair.78 Arden-Mayfair was a Delaware corporation with prin-
cipal executive offices in California. Arden-Mayfair's primary
business was the operation of a chain of supermarkets in five
western states, including California. Arden-Mayfair had almost
12,000 shareholders located in every state of the United States, yet
Arden-Mayfair was within the purview of section 2115 because
sixty percent of the company's payroll, property, and sales were
attributable to California, and approximately sixty-seven percent
of issued securities were held by persons with California ad-
dresses. Pursuant to authority granted by Delaware's General
Corporations Law, Arden-Mayfair's bylaws provided for straight
77. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
78. Civ. No. C-192-091 (Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County, May 1, 1978). Louart
will have major ramifications in the business community and may become a
landmark case in California corporation law history. Though decided only at the
superior court level as of this writing, the case is cited in 1A BALLAN= & STER-
LING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS § 393.04, ch. 18-41 n.20.1 (4th ed. 1978), and
California law professors have discussed the Louart decision with classes in cor-
poration law.
one-vote-per-share voting of capital stock79 and a "classified" or
staggered board of directors to serve one- to three-year terms.80
Louart, a California corporation and the principal shareholder
of Arden-Mayfair, brought an action under section 2115 for a writ
of mandamus to compel Arden-Mayfair to comply with California
corporate law provisions requiring annual election of all direc-
tors8' and mandatory cumulation of votes for the directors' elec-
tion.82 A California superior court, in ruling for Arden-Mayfair,
found that if section 2115 were applied to Arden-Mayfair it would
"impact and unduly burden Arden-Mayfair's transaction of busi-
ness in interstate commerce."83 The court anticipated that power
struggles and manipulations might take place if section 2115 were
applied. For example, under section 2115's mandate for single
election of all directors by cumulative voting, Louart would be
able to elect a majority of the board, thereby making itself incum-
bent management. Louart could then manipulate the ownership
factor of the number of shares held by persons with a California
address to less than fifty percent.84 The Delaware charter and by-
laws would be resuscitated, section 2115 would no longer control,
and the previous structure, complete with staggered terms and
straight voting, would preserve Louart's management domina-
tion.85
The court believed that application of section 2115 would "sub-
ject Arden-Mayfair to the hazard of potentially conflicting claims
of shareholders ... [and] to the hovering and continuing uncer-
tainty with respect to matters which are central to its internal
governance in that California statutes purport to displace the
laws of Delaware."8 6 Relying on the commerce clause, the court
invalidated the application of section 2115 to Arden-Mayfair. The
court reasoned that otherwise legitimate interests of each state
must yield when a burden would be placed on interstate com-
merce if every state with an interest were to apply its own law.8 7
The interaction of section 2115 with similar laws of other states
79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (1975).
80. Id. § 141(d).
81. CAL. CORP. CODE § 301 (West 1977).
82. Id. § 708 (a)-(c) (West Supp. 1978).
83. Louart v. Arden-Mayfair, Civ. No. C-192-091, at 17 (Super. Ct. of Los Ange-
les County, May 1, 1978).
84. For examples of how Louart might accomplish manipulation of the stock
ownership factor, see text accompanying notes 41-47 supra.
85. Louart v. Arden-Mayfair, Civ. No. C-192-091, at 17 (Super. Ct. of Los Ange-
les County, May 1, 1978).
86. Id. at 16.
87. Id. at 21 (quoting Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on State
Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 84 HARv. L. REV. 806, 808 (1971)).
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could place an additional burden on interstate commerce. Califor-
nia has chosen a two-pronged test to determine when California
law applies to a foreign corporation's internal affairs. One test re-
lates to the average of payroll, property, and sales; the other test
concerns the addresses of securities holders. Has California uti-
lized the proper tests or employed all the necessary criteria? An-
other state might enact the same controls using different criteria
embodied in a more demanding or less demanding test. A corpo-
ration doing business in several states, each state with its own
test and regulatory scheme, would be reduced to chaos. Litigation
involving which state law to apply would be monumental,88 as
would litigation over the actual factual determinations.
Under California's Corporation Law, a corporation failing to
comply with section 2115 is liable for misdemeanor sanctions in
the form of a fine of not less than $500 or greater than $1,000.89 A
court of equity can mandate compliance, enforceable by the
threat of contempt. Other states might also have sanctions. Cor-
porate directors would spend excessive amounts of time seeking
to avoid a state's penalties.9 0 A recent case, Great Western United
Corp. v. Kidwell,91 involving Idaho's corporate takeover law, is il-
lustrative of the conflict presented when several states seek to
control a subject area requiring uniform regulation.
Great Western, a 1978 Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision,
invalidated Idaho's corporate takeover statute92 under the com-
merce clause. Great Western, a Delaware corporation with head-
quarters in Texas, initiated a takeover of Sunshine Mining and
Metal Company, a Washington corporation with its principal ex-
ecutive office and over fifty percent of its assets in Idaho and
shareholders throughout the United States.
Idaho's takeover law subjected Great Western to stricter regula-
tions and disclosure requirements than the Federal Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 governing corporate tender offers.93 Because
88. For a recent Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in which the threat of
multiple litigation caused considerable confusion, see Great W. United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), and text accompanying notes 87 supra and
89-95 infra.
89. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2258 (West 1977).
90. See text accompanying notes 48-52 supra.
91. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978).
92. IDAHO CODE tit. 30, ch. 15 (Supp. 1977).
93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i), 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976). These code sections,
taken together, are commonly referred to as the Williams Act
the target company owned subsidiary manufacturing facilities in
Maryland and conducted significant business activities in New
York, Great Western was faced with the problem of meeting the
requirements of three states' takeover statutes.94 Compliance
with the statutes would have required Great Western to wait for
New York and Maryland to rule on the applicability of their laws
and to wait for an Idaho hearing and judicial review procedure. 95
Great Western chose, instead, to sue the officials of New York,
Maryland, and Idaho who were responsible for enforcing the take-
over laws. Maryland chose not to assert jurisdiction and New
York later relinquished any interest in the matter, leaving Great
Western to contend with only the Idaho statute. The district
court found Idaho's takeover statute an unconstitutional burden
on interstate commerce.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered
Idaho's primary interest in enacting its takeover statute. Two ma-
jor purposes were noted: investor protection and the state's inter-
est in benevolent corporate management.96 The court concluded
that even though the interests served by Idaho's takeover statute
were legitimate local interests, they did not justify the law's sub-
stantial impact on interstate commerce. Not only did the statute
tend to assist some shareholders while hindering others, 97 but the
statute also hindered movement of local businesses to other
states.98
Although Great Western involved a state's takeover law rather
than a statute asserting control over a foreign corporation as does
California's section 2115, the case is illustrative of several endur-
ing problems. When multiple states either assert the power to
regulate or have the statutory authority to do so-as did Idaho,
Maryland, and New York in Great Western-the corporation is
placed in a confusing position. Great Western had to resort to liti-
gation over the matter at tremendous expense and waste of time.
The true purpose of Idaho's takeover statute was to protect inves-
tors, much as section 2115's purpose is shareholder and creditor
protection. Granted the legitimacy of this purpose, application of
the Idaho takeover statute not only interfered with commerce but
actually blocked over $31 million of interstate commerce by delay-
ing an interstate tender offer that otherwise would have gone for-
ward.99 Idaho's provision sought to regulate a corporate activity
94. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1263 (5th Cir. 1978).
95. Id. at 1264.
96. Id. at 1283.
97. Id. at 1285.
98. Id. at 1286.
99. Id.
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affecting internal affairs. Similarly, section 2115 mandates regula-
tion of the internal operations and structure of a foreign corpora-
tion.
The Cumulative Effect
Although one regulated corporation, viewed alone, may not ap-
pear to have a great effect on trade among the states, the courts
have historically paid particular attention to the cumulative ef-
fects of a statute on the free flow of commerce. 00 In Wickard v.
Filburn,101 the United States Supreme Court found that because
a small amount of wheat grown by a farmer for private consump-
tion competed with wheat in commerce, the wheat was subject to
federal agricultural production regulations.102 The Court rea-
soned that although the amount of the defendant's home-grown
wheat was insignificant, when added to the home-grown wheat
raised by many others, the cumulative effect was far from triv-
ial.' 03
This cumulative effect concept has been stated as follows:
"[R]egulations that individually seem only local in impact can
collectively burden multi-state enterprises to such a degree that
all will be barred by the negative implications of the commerce
clause."' 04 Hundreds of corporations, if confused with respect to
their internal affairs, could significantly impede the flow of com-
merce.
The Statute Must Regulate Evenhandedly
The Constitutional Guarantee of Equal Protection of the
Laws
Fundamental to examining any government legislation is the
United States constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
laws. 0 - Any government discrimination must be tested against
100. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wabash, St. Louis &
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
101. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
102. Id. at 128.
103. Id. at 127-28.
104. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrT=rIONAL LAW § 6-11, at 338 (1978).
105. The provision found in § 1 of the 14th amendment guaranteeing equal pro-
tection reads as follows: "[N] or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
the fundamental requirements of the equal protection clause.
A corporation is considered a domiciliary and a "person" of its
incorporating state.106 Governmental action may deprive a person
of equal protection of the laws by two methods. First, equality is
denied when a government discriminates between persons who
should be regarded as similarly situated.0 7 If a corporation's se-
curities are traded on a national securities exchange certified by
the California Commissioner of Corporations, section 2115(e) ex-
empts that corporation from mandatory compliance. 108 The re-
quired certification is predicated on federal requirements wholly
unrelated to California's purpose of shareholder and creditor pro-
tection in enacting section 2115.
Companies listed on a certified national securities exchange
need not provide some of the shareholder protections, such as cu-
mulative voting rights and annual election of directors, required
of unlisted companies through application of section 2115. A stat-
utory discrimination, if allowed to exist, must be based on differ-
ences that are reasonably related to the purpose of the statute so
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.109
Section 2115, by exempting companies listed on certified national
securities exchanges, has created a select class of exempted cor-
porations based on criteria bearing no reasonable relationship to
the statutory goals of shareholder and creditor protection."10 The
type of discrimination permitted by section 2115(e) cannot be jus-
tified under the equal protection clause.
A second circumstance in which equal protection is denied oc-
curs when government fails to classify, with the result that regu-
lations do not distinguish between persons who should be
regarded as differently situated.1 1 ' Section 2115 treats corpora-
tions having substantial interstate operations and shareholders
scattered across the country the same way it treats "tramp" cor-
porations. Tramp corporations are those doing all of their busi-
tion the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis ad-
ded).
106. Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 453 (1874); St. Louis v. The
Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall,) 423, 429 (1870).
107. L. TRmE, AmmicAN CONsTrrtmoNAL LAw 993 (1978).
108. CAL. Coin. CoDn § 2115(e) (West Supp. 1978). As of this writing, only
those corporations having securities listed on the New York or American Stock
Exchanges are allowed to claim this exemption.
109. The minimum rationality criterion of equal protection was first stated in
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). The Burger Court has
invalidated statutory classifications voicing this traditional equal protection crite-
rion. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).
110. See text accompanying notes 66-71 supra.
111. L. TRIBE, A1mEw-cAN CONSTrJtmoNL. LAw 993 (1978).
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ness in California though incorporated elsewhere, in contrast to
foreign corporations engaged in extensive interstate business.
The California legislature should regulate "tramp" and multistate
pseudo-foreign corporations differently. A failure to make this
distinction in treatment of foreign corporations renders the stat-
ute violative of the equal protection clause.
RECOIVMVENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
Federal Intervention
Uniformity of corporate regulation, if desired, must be provided
by the federal government, not by the states." 2 Several commen-
tators have proposed various degrees of federal regulation." 3 The
demand for more federal corporate law has come largely from
those who feel that the current state-oriented system of regulat-
ing national interstate corporations is inadequate and often cor-
rupt.n14
The proposals fall into two categories: a comprehensive federal
corporation act preempting the individual state laws and federal
guidelines establishing minimum standards of corporate responsi-
bility applicable to all states. Under a comprehensive federal cor-
porate law, choice-of-law questions concerning internal corporate
affairs would cease to be an issue. State regulation would termi-
nate and be replaced by exclusive federal chartering." 5
A more feasible solution would be to establish minimum federal
corporation law provisions applicable to companies doing busi-
ness in interstate commerce. To insure that the provisions would
be uniformly interpreted, questions concerning the code would
require exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. Perhaps a
112. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 781 (1945).
113. See generally Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Del-
aware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 700-05 (1974); Smith, Delaware Works Hard to Stay a Cor-
porate Home Sweet Home, FORTUNE, Feb. 13, 1978, at 132, 134; Young, Federal
Corporate Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
146, 147 (1978); Comment, Regulation of Corporate Management: Minority Share-
holder Protection, 46 U. CiN. L. REV. 846, 851 (1977).
114. *See, e.g., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Dela-
ware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 663-92 (1974); Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Cor-
porate Policy, 21 VA=m. L. REV. 433, 437 (1968).
115. One recognized authority in corporate law, William L. Cary, has viewed
federal incorporation as politically unrealistic. Although the idea has been raised
many times in Congress, Professor Cary believes American business would unani-
mously reject such a proposal. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections7
Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 700 (1974).
number of special federal corporate forums could be established
to adjudicate questions arising under this new federal law. In ef-
fect, this solution would continue to allow companies to incorpo-
rate in the jurisdiction of their choice, but many of the incentives
to organize in states with lenient, pro-management laws would be
eliminated.
California Action
In the absence of federal regulation, California would be pru-
dent either to revise section 2115 or to abolish it altogether. Ei-
ther choice should attempt to bring treatment of foreign
corporations doing business in California within the ambit of the
United States Constitution.
California's legislature erred in attempting to codify control
over the internal affairs of foreign corporations. Prior to the en-
actment of section 2115, California courts had been effectively reg-
ulating the same foreign corporations through judicially
recognized exceptions to the internal affairs doctrine.116 The re-
peal of section 2115 would allow a return to judicial determination
on an ad hoc basis and to the less definitive, yet less constitution-
ally offensive, test of "substantial business contacts."" 7
Alternatively, section 2115's tests of applicablity should be mod-
ified. The current "one half" test could be replaced by a "substan-
tial amount" standard, placing greater emphasis upon the
particular facts of each case.
Subdivisions (c) and (d), providing for annual determination of
section 2115's applicability, should be abandoned. A corporation
cannot build a business upon a foundation of annually fluctuating
internal operations.
CONCLUSION
Section 2115, although enacted as a good faith attempt by the
California legislature to protect shareholders and creditors, seri-
ously conflicts with the commerce clause and other United States
constitutional provisions. A corporation's attempt to comply with
section 2115 could result in internal confusion, with an ultimate
loss of business opportunities. Efforts to avoid application of sec-
tion 2115 might result in corporate relocations, movement of
plants and facilities to out-of-state locations, and rejection of new
business. Suppliers and dependent businesses would be affected.
Section 2115's yearly determination of applicability might drasti-
116. See notes 27-37 and accompanying text supra.
117. See text accompanying notes 31-36 supra.
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cally increase litigation, create struggles for control among the
states, and create confusion as to which state law should apply.
The effects would be particularly devastating to fluctuating, rap-
idly expanding new businesses. All of these difficulties have far
more than an incidental effect on interstate commerce.
In the absence of federal legislation regulating corporate inter-
nal affairs, choice-of-law decisions should remain the subject of
judicial determination on an ad hoc basis. The California Legisla-
ture should seriously consider repeal or modification of section
2115.
MARK E. K.RUSE

